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Abstract
This paper builds on the ongoing discussion on the regulation and marketisation of the higher educa-
tion system. Its aim is to study the higher education market (des)equilibrium. Teixeira, Rosa and Amaral
(2004) have analysed the presence/absence of market mechanisms in the Portuguese higher education
sector. This paper describes supply and demand in the Portuguese system. On the supply side, it looks
at indicators such as place distribution and diversity, whereas on the demand side, indicators based on
the revealed preferences are computed. It goes a step further in quantifying the (mis)match between the
two sides of the market, by suggesting and computing a set of strength and weakness indicators. These
indicators are then used in predicting the potential impact of changes in higher education regulations on
the market equilibrium and stability.
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1 Introduction
Over the last quarter of the twentieth century, the European higher education sector wit-
nessed an expansion with no precedent. As an example, the number of higher education
students has more than doubled between 1980 and 2000 (Eurydice, 2000). Also have the
opportunities in higher education expanded and nowadays there is almost always a chance
for those who want to proceed their studies (Hoxby, 2004). Despite these improvements, the
Lisbon Strategy and an increasing international competition from the US, China and India,
have made of the reform of higher education systems a hot topic across Europe. The imple-
mentation of the Bologna declaration, which aims at creating a European higher education
area, is part of that reform process. The role of the government and markets in renewing
the European higher education system has been the subject of several research and policy
papers (see, for example, Teixeira, Rosa and Amaral, 2004).
In this paper we look at the extent and impact of public regulation, namely, on the
adequacy between the tertiary education supply and demand, by focusing on the imbal-
ances in the undergraduate students market.1 Data for the Portuguese public higher ed-
ucation system, on which candidates have revealed their preferences and places by pro-
gramme/institution, is being used to compute some indicators of the (in)adequacy between
supply and demand in the higher education market. This is an important step towards a
better understanding of its functioning, making of this paper an extension of Teixeira et
al. (2004), which discusses the existence of a higher education market in Portugal. The
set of indicators we defined and computed makes it possible to identify the strengths and
weaknesses of the Portuguese higher education system.
There are several reasons that may justify the state intervention in the higher educa-
tion market: externalities, information-related problems, monopoly and market power, and
income redistribution.2 To attenuate the effects of these market failures on social welfare,
governments have been using several policy instruments: spill-over effects have justified huge
public investments in higher education; information-related problems have motivated the cre-
ation of quality control mechanisms; in order to guarantee some degree of competition and
diversity, governments have intervened to influence the higher education market structure;
1We consider that supply is the offer of higher education programmes, measured in terms of places available, and demand
is measured using the preferences of the applicants over higher education institutions and programmes. It would also be
interesting to analyze the matching between the supply of graduates, the output of the higher education system, and the
demand for graduates, that depends on the society organization and on the economy structure. It is important to note that
there is no single higher education market, instead there is a multitude of markets; namely: a market for students, for researchers,
for lecturers, for scholarships and grants, for graduates, among others (Jongbloed, 2003). In the present study, we concentrate
in a specific market: the market for undergraduate students, which will be referred to when speaking of market.
2For a detailed description of these market failures see, for example, Jongbloed (2003, 2004).
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student social support have been provided, through grants and scholarships, to ensure access
to higher education to an increasing number of students.
Although there is a consensus on the regulating role of the state in higher education
systems, some authors ascribe the relative failure of the European higher education system,
among other factors, to an excessive public control (see, for example, van der Ploeg and
Veuglers, 2006). In many countries, governments have been discussing ways to redefine
the role of the state and the implementation of marketisation policies in higher education
(Jongbloed, 2003).
Supporters of a more prominent role of markets in the higher education system would ar-
gue that more competition between institutions and performance-based funding, through the
increase of the agents freedom to adjust to the changes in demand and supply, would result
in higher quality and variety of services. In the end, the implementation of marketisation
policies would contribute to a better match between supply and demand.
According to Sima˜o, Santos and Costa (2004) the regulation of the Portuguese higher
education system aims at guaranteeing the access to a degree to the highest number of stu-
dents, which should facilitate the integration of workers in the labour market and contribute
to the social and economic development of the country. The state, regarding the regulation
of the higher education system, should also take into account a cost-benefit analysis (Sima˜o
et al., 2004). The extensive regulation of the Portuguese higher education system, affecting
both sides of the market, poses important barriers to the freedom of consumers (students)
and suppliers (institutions). On the supply side, new institutions, study programmes and
places offer are subject to ministerial approval, and higher education providers cannot freely
choose the amount to be charged as tuition fee. On the demand side, students do not bear
the full cost of the education received, they are poorly informed consumers and the nu-
merus clausus is a very strong restriction to the applicants’ choices. At the same time that
both producers and consumers decide in a constrained environment, the Portuguese higher
education system has accompanied the general tendency to an increasing supply that has
overcome the demand, resulting in a rising competition for students among higher education
providers.
The paper unfolds as follows. The higher education sector in Portugal is the focus of
Section 2. Section 3 provides a detailed analysis on the mechanisms at stake in the higher
education market in both demand and supply sides. In Section 4, we introduce and compute
some indicators on the demand-supply (mis)matching, and discuss explanations that have
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been suggested in the literature. We discuss the potential effect of some policies aiming at
the marketisation of the higher education sector. Finally, Section 5 concludes and points out
possible directions for future research.
2 The Portuguese higher education system: institutions and reg-
ulation
The Portuguese higher education system is a binary system, with universities and polytech-
nics as the main providers. The distinctive feature between universities and polytechnics is
the focus on research, as polytechnics are not expected to conduct fundamental research,
and should offer vocationally or professionally oriented study programmes.3 The higher ed-
ucation system consists of 27 universities, 40 university schools, 17 polytechnic institutes
and 76 polytechnic schools, making a total of 160 units, including both private and public
higher education providers. The latter comprises 14 universities, 15 polytechnic institutes,
9 nursery schools and 2 other polytechnic schools.4
A large number of institutions, for a small number of participants, is a key feature of the
Portuguese higher education network (OECD, 2006). Except for the universities of Coim-
bra, Lisbon, and Oporto and for the Technical University, most public higher education
institutions were created quite recently. In particular, most universities were created in the
mid-1970s. Until the mid-1980s the system was characterised by a high regional concentra-
tion. From the mid-1980s onwards, polytechnics have guaranteed regional diversification to
the higher education system. That is, “public polytechnics had strong regional orientation
[...] and were always regarded as the primary instrument for providing higher education to
the more remote areas of the country”(MCTES, 2006: 55). In the 1990s, the number of
students enrolled in the tertiary education has doubled, reaching 400,000 in 2000. The great
expansion of the higher education system in the last decades resulted in a reduction of the
relative weight of public universities in total enrolments: in 2004/05 it represented 45% of
total enrolments, against 78% of total enrolments in the school year 1983/84.
Most higher education institutions offer study programmes in several fields of study, which
the Ministry of Science, Technology and Higher Education (MCTES, Ministe´rio da Cieˆncia,
da Tecnologia e do Ensino Superior) classified, in 2006, for application purposes, in ten
areas: Agriculture, Architecture, Natural Sciences, Law and Social Sciences, Economics,
3Note, however, that in some cases there is some indefinition, as, for instance, some universities offer polytechnic-type study
programmes.
4As well as the Open University and military institutions.
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Sports and Arts, Education, Humanities, Health, and Technology.
Following the signature of the Bologna declaration, higher education study programmes
have to be restructured and organized into three cycles.5 The first cycle consists of a three-
to four-year programme, and it is called licenciatura.6 Since undergraduate studies used to
last four years in most cases, higher education institutions have to make a downsizing effort.
They were given the option to adapt to the Bologna rules in 2006/07, or to postpone it to
any of the next two school years. About 43% of the programmes have been adjusted to
conform to the Bologna rules in 2006/07. The second cycle corresponds to the master and
takes three to four semesters,7 being followed by the doctorate, which corresponds to the
third cycle. According to OECD (2006), the implementation of the Bologna process is an
opportunity to renew the study programme offer in Portugal and, therefore, should be seen
as an instrument for its rationalization.
The MCTES has been in charge of the higher education sector, by regulating it through
various mechanisms. Accreditation and quality assessment are among the instruments avail-
able to regulate the public higher education system. However, according to the University
Autonomy Act of 1988, the approval of new study programmes and degrees is just a bureau-
cratic procedure, i.e., universities have almost total freedom to initiate or terminate study
programmes. These decisions do not depend on an evaluation or accreditation process: only
formal inconsistency concerning the duration or the total number of credits can conduct to
refusing universities’ new degrees. Public polytechnics’ study programmes need a formal
approval by the MCTES, based on technical and scientific report.8 Private institution study
programmes must follow a much more demanding approval process. The approval process
can take up to four years and needs a technical and academic report by an external expert
committee (ENQA, 2006).
The great expansion of the higher education system in the 1990s, namely the increas-
ing number of private higher education institutions, generated a consensus on the need of
establishing a national quality assurance system that would provide a more efficient regula-
tion of the system. The Higher Education Evaluation Act 38/94 defined the framework for
the evaluation of higher education in Portugal, which resulted in the creation, in 1998, of
5The framework legislation for the implementation of the Bologna process in Portugal was published in March 2006 (DL
74/2006 of 24 March).
6Some exceptions apply; namely, some engineering study programmes have been restructured to offer a joint first and second
cycle degree, the so-called integrated master.
7However, the Portuguese Comprehensive Law on the Education System admits that a master degree can be awarded after
only two semesters, under special authorization.
8New study programmes in private institutions are subject to very strict requirements, and institutions must be officially
recognised in order to award degrees.
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the national evaluation agency, CNAVES (Conselho Nacional de Avaliac¸a˜o do Ensino Supe-
rior). Although it contributed to develop a culture of self-evaluation, CNAVES evaluations
did not produce any consequences in terms of suspending a study programme or decreasing
funds for a specific institution (ENQA, 2006). The Portuguese MCTES is now leading the
assessment process of the higher education system in order to reorganise and rationalise it
(MCTES, 2006); and definite steps towards quality assessment of higher education institu-
tions are being taken.9 In 2005, the MCTES announced the extinction of CNAVES and the
creation of a new accreditation agency is planned for 2007. The agency will be in charge
of the programme evaluation, which can therefore work as a barrier to entry, as well as an
improvement on market information.
Another instrument used by the MCTES to regulate the higher education system is the
numerus clausus, which defines the maximum number of students for each study programme
in both public and private sectors. Numerus clausus works as a restriction on the supply
side of the system, affecting the size and composition of the tertiary education sector. Those
restrictions have been settled “without a formal national higher education planning frame-
work”, notwithstanding, it has been used as a political instrument to affect the regional
distribution of students (OECD, 2006: 26).
The MCTES regulates the access to the higher education system through admission poli-
cies as well. Currently, access to public higher education works through a national com-
petition based on students’ revealed preferences and their grade point average, which is a
weighted average of their marks in upper secondary education and in national examina-
tions.10 In practice, each study programme has to define a compulsory examination in one
or two disciplines, and the weight given to each grade and exam, within the limits estab-
lished by the Ministry itself. Students, on their side, have to rank up to six pairs study
programme/institution, from the most (the first one) to the least preferred (the last one) al-
ternative. A nationwide tournament involving all candidates and places follows. Admission
policies are crucial for the number of candidates and students’ enrolment in higher education,
as changes in access conditions may result in great changes in the number of candidates. For
example, in 1989, the end of a minimum mark requirement in national examinations coin-
cided with an increase of 20,000 candidates (more than 60%). The reintroduction of national
9Different institutions have been in charge of producing reports on the Portuguese higher education system: (i) a self-
proposed evaluation report of several higher education institutions by the European University Association (EUA), the OECD
(2006) report, that aims at an overall evaluation of the Portuguese higher education system, and the European Association for
Quality Assurance in Higher Education report (ENQA, 2006) which provides an analysis of the system of quality assurance
and sets the directions for the new accreditation agency.
10In the private sector there is a decentralized application system.
5
examinations, in 1996, and minimum marks (95/200), in 2004, coincided with a reduction of
candidates and enrolments, which were reinforced by demographic trends (MCTES, 2006).
Public funding of higher education institutions is guaranteed through several channels:
a funding formula, based on which direct funding of institutions is defined; contracts for
specific activities; the funding of social support services, mainly student grants, meals and
accommodation; and research funds. The funding formula, which is the basis for the annual
budget of public universities and polytechnics, takes into consideration, among other factors,
the teacher/student ratio and the non-teaching staff/teacher ratio. Although it accounts for
the qualifications of the teaching staff and the fields of study, the funding formula depends
mainly on the number of enrolled students. Whether this is an adequate performance mea-
sure or not is a controversial issue. The Ministry argues, however, that in the current
context of excess capacity, where institutions compete for students, the student enrolment
is also a performance indicator (MCTES, 2006). Given the weight of students’ enrolment
in the funding formula, the recent decline in overall enrolments in tertiary education poses
a problem to the financial sustainability of higher education institutions. Institutions with
lower occupation rates will be the most affected by financial constraints.11 In 2006, the
Government applied a new formula for determining the direct funding of public higher ed-
ucation institutions, which aimed at introducing quality and performance criteria, namely,
the qualification of the teaching staff and the graduation rate (MCTES, 2006). In recent
years, the Government has defined research activities as strategic, and therefore, in 2005
and 2006, the science and technology funds increased by 17% and 60%, respectively, whereas
education funds remained the same.
The human capital theory is at the centre of the analysis of the Economics of Higher Ed-
ucation. The basic hypothesis states that students invest in their education in the present,
and therefore they bear the education-related costs and forego earnings, which will be re-
warded in the future by means of higher wages. Apart from living expenses, which take
an important share of student budgets, they have to pay tuition fees. In 1997, there was
a substantial increase in the tuition price, followed by another one in 2003, which resulted
in a significant improvement of higher education institutions’ budgets. In 2006, the revenue
from tuition fees represented nearly 17% of the total revenue of public higher education
institutions, which is close to the OECD average of 19% (OECD, 2006: 81).
When deciding on whether to attend higher education, students think in terms of afford-
ability, i.e., the extent to which there are enough means available to cover education-related
11So far, these constraints have been minored by the inclusion of ‘cohesion factors’ that limit year to year budget variations.
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costs. Student social support, namely, grants and accommodation, is crucial for ensuring the
same higher education opportunities to all students and for preventing low-income students
from not continuing their studies. Student funding affects the demand for higher education,
since the bank loan system availability is limited and for reduced amounts only. Approx-
imately 24% of the enrolled students benefit from a grant. This percentage is similar to
the one in Spain, but it is much smaller than those in northern European countries. Ac-
commodation is provided to only 4% of the students in higher education (MCTES, 2006:
56-57).
To conclude, the ongoing assessment of the Portuguese higher education system takes
place in a time when the imbalance between demand and supply becomes more and more
visible. After a period of extraordinary growth of the number of candidates and registered
students in the tertiary education system, since 2003/04 total enrolments have decreased
(OCES, 2007b: 15). Simultaneously, the increasing graduate unemployment rate and the
need to prepare the labour market for a knowledge-based society has brought to public
discussion the issue of the public funds distribution across fields of study. Furthermore, the
government regulates the higher education system by controlling access conditions, favouring
accreditation and quality assessment of study programmes and institutions, and funding both
institutions and students. These regulation mechanisms translate into rigidity in the system
and have, therefore, resulted in a sluggish adjustment to changes in demand, which we will
characterize in the next section.
3 The higher education market for undergraduate students
This section quantifies higher education supply and demand. As explained above, the al-
location of candidates to institutions and study programmes is the result of a nationwide
tournament and it is based on their stated preferences. The analysis is then based on a
data set consisting of those revealed preferences. We will focus on the public sector, as it
is governed by a more homogeneous set of rules and benefits from a centralized application
process. Furthermore, the data are publicly available in a website created for that purpose
by the MCTES.12 The data available include information on institution/programme pairs,
from 2003/04 to 2006/07; namely: number of applicants placing each pair among their pref-
erences, total number of times a given pair is the first option, the mean of the grade point
average of students who applied for each study programme and who were admitted to it.
12The information is available at: www.acessoensinosuperior.pt.
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3.1 Supply side
Several measures can be used to look at the supply side of the higher education market. In
particular, the distribution of study programmes and places, as well as programme diversity,
are used to portray the higher education supply in Portugal.
Table 1: Distribution of study programmes by area of study, 2003-2006
2003/04 2004/05 2005/06 2006/07
Area Abs. Rel. Abs. Rel. Abs. Rel. Abs. Rel.
Agriculture 73 0.07 69 0.07 69 0.07 64 0.06
Architecture 58 0.06 63 0.06 73 0.07 72 0.07
Natural sciences 87 0.09 92 0.09 87 0.08 80 0.08
Law and social sciences 107 0.11 129 0.12 145 0.14 162 0.16
Economics 113 0.11 117 0.11 119 0.11 109 0.11
Sports and arts 25 0.02 29 0.03 33 0.03 32 0.03
Education 123 0.12 101 0.1 90 0.09 70 0.07
Humanities 99 0.1 102 0.1 98 0.09 76 0.08
Health 99 0.1 107 0.1 111 0.11 112 0.11
Technology 224 0.22 231 0.22 232 0.22 214 0.22
Total 1008 1040 1057 991
The total number of study programmes has shown a quite stable distribution over time,
but it hides variation across fields of study (see Table 1). In fact, the increasing number of
study programmes in Architecture, Law and Social Sciences, and Sports and Arts, has been
compensated by a decrease in the number of studies in areas such as Agriculture and Edu-
cation. Regardless of the school year, Technology study programmes take the biggest share
in the higher education offer, whereas the lowest share goes to Sports and Arts. Technology,
Law and Social Sciences, Economics and Management, and Health represented all together
about 60% of the Portuguese public higher education supply in 2006.
There is also a spatial dimension concerning the study programme offer. Looking at
Table 2 some spatial patterns emerge. Firstly, most of the placement offer is concentrated
in Lisbon as well as in the North and Centre regions. The South (Alentejo and Algarve),
together with the islands (Madeira and Azores), take only a small share of the overall offer
of the public higher education sector. Secondly, this picture is basically the same across
areas of study, except for study programme offer in the field of Agriculture, which shows up
as important in Alentejo, contrasting with a smaller share in more urbanized areas, such as
Lisbon.
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Table 2: Distribution of study programmes by region (NUTS2) and area
of study, 2006
NUT2 agric arch natsc lawsoc eco sparts educ hum health tec Total
Alentejo 11 7 7 18 8 8 9 6 8 12 94
Algarve 3 4 4 8 7 1 4 4 8 7 50
Centre 13 23 23 56 35 10 18 20 29 66 293
Lisbon 8 19 19 30 27 6 8 22 27 53 219
North 27 16 23 38 28 6 26 22 34 70 290
Azores 2 1 2 8 2 2 1 4 5 27
Madeira 2 2 4 2 1 3 1 2 1 18
Total 64 72 80 162 109 32 70 76 112 214 991
Note: The study areas in the table are the following: agriculture (agric),
architecture (arch), natural sciences (natsc), law and social sciences
(lawsoc), economics (eco), sports and arts (sparts), education (educ),
humanities (hum), health (health), and technology (tec).
Despite providing a first picture of the higher education market, the distribution of the
study programme supply does not fully characterize the supply side. Another important
issue, also related to access policies, is that of capacity. The capacity of the Portuguese
higher education system is decided on a yearly basis by the MCTES, which approves the
distribution of places across studies proposed by each higher education institution.
Table 3: Distribution of places by institution and area of study, 2006
Institution agric arch natsc lawsoc eco sparts educ hum health tec Total Diversity
ESuperiores 60 185 1003 50 1298
PI Beja 115 30 25 165 50 25 55 70 91 626 0.872
PI Braganc¸a 198 40 195 250 60 205 25 220 530 1723 0.834
PI Castelo Branco 42 100 224 130 80 25 150 224 975 0.826
PI Ca´vado 81 25 135 85 326 0.547
PI Coimbra 180 70 30 295 300 30 95 20 180 520 1720 0.836
PI Guarda 30 25 234 160 35 70 30 110 105 799 0.838
PI Leiria 60 160 90 460 215 85 95 35 120 316 1636 0.886
PI Lisbon 55 35 202 333 166 385 720 1896 0.706
PI Oporto 40 45 315 500 154 65 410 865 2394 0.731
PI Portalegre 80 69 209 72 55 72 77 96 730 0.860
PI Santare´m 50 20 135 170 154 90 90 85 794 0.846
PI Setu´bal 25 25 142 302 20 78 16 109 482 1199 0.716
PI Tomar 35 172 35 210 35 242 729 0.653
PI Viana do Castelo 99 70 60 66 30 105 66 210 706 0.839
PI Viseu 223 60 302 200 185 30 120 265 1385 0.835
Total Polytechnic 1137 1017 225 3058 3278 439 1433 353 3110 4886 18936 0.860
ISCTE 35 334 361 35 126 891 0.549
Technical U 260 343 110 343 498 154 70 1355 3133 0.736
U Algarve 90 120 145 315 315 30 135 105 225 275 1755 0.932
U Aveiro 45 85 272 167 365 30 75 167 158 627 1991 0.857
U Azores 22 25 40 178 70 40 20 45 85 525 0.841
U Beira Interior 170 145 165 110 100 21 70 190 240 1211 0.900
U Coimbra 40 60 285 870 275 95 120 269 449 604 3067 0.859
U E´vora 80 110 167 165 90 50 60 80 76 95 973 0.969
U Lisbon 260 685 920 40 90 741 653 245 3634 0.785
Continued on next page...
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... table 3 continued
Institution agric arch natsc lawsoc eco sparts educ hum health tec Total Diversity
U Madeira 30 50 114 55 20 60 25 73 120 547 0.887
U Minho 100 272 427 172 111 230 194 718 2224 0.813
U Nova 85 55 205 375 465 20 295 200 755 2455 0.812
U Oporto 120 313 485 530 330 110 55 365 730 900 3938 0.900
UTAD 143 25 187 338 85 95 100 45 72 210 1300 0.906
Total University 885 1731 3048 5241 3191 744 867 2447 3135 6355 27644 0.911
Total 2022 2748 3273 8299 6469 1183 2300 2800 6245 11241 46580 0.910
Notes: 1. The number of places is computed as the maximum number of vacancies among the
values announced for the two phases
2. The study areas in columns are the following: agriculture (agric), architecture (arch), natural
sciences (natsc), law and social sciences (lawsoc), economics (eco), sports and arts (sparts), educa-
tion (educ), humanities (hum), health (health), and technology (tec).
3. ESuperiores is the short for Escolas Superiores, which include nine nursing schools, a nautic
school and a hotel manegement school. Because all these schools have a very specialized offer, we
opted for collapsing the vacancies.
4. The diversity index is computed as in equation (1), for each higher education institution. It does
not apply to the set of schools under the name ESuperiores. Note that nursing schools offer study
programs on health only, implying that the diversity index takes the value 0 for most institutions
in that set.
5. U stands for University and PI stands for Polytechnic Institute.
Table 3 shows the distribution of places by institution and field of study, in 2006. Several
important results are evident in this table. Firstly, the university takes almost 60% of the
total capacity, measured as the number of places. That is, there is place for almost 28000
new students to attend university, whereas about 19000 may go to a polytechnic. Secondly,
the institutions with the biggest capacity belong to the university sector. For example,
the capacity of 5 out of 14 universities is above that of the biggest Polytechnic Institute.
Furthermore, the biggest (and also the oldest) four universities (Universities of Coimbra,
Lisbon and Oporto, and the Technical University) take 13772 places, that is, about 29.5% of
the total places available in the public higher education subsystem. Thirdly, such capacity
is not evenly distributed across institutions within higher education sector. Looking at the
polytechnic sector places, big institutions like the one in Oporto, coexist with small ones
(e.g., IP Ca´vado&Ave). Also in the university sector, the University of Oporto, the biggest
institution, is almost 8 times bigger than the smallest one (University of Azores).
Table 4: Distribution of places by region (NUTS2) and area of study,
2006
NUT2 agric arch natsc lawsoc eco sparts educ hum health tec Total Diversity
Alentejo 325 229 192 674 382 229 260 152 313 367 3123 0.961
Algarve 90 120 145 315 315 30 135 105 225 275 1755 0.932
Centre 432 867 822 2585 1765 375 671 651 1677 2878 12723 0.906
Lisbon 370 773 1035 2376 2144 234 334 1087 1735 3733 13821 0.877
North 783 704 989 2057 1738 295 800 760 2082 3783 13991 0.903
Continued on next page...
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... table 4 continued
NUT2 agric arch natsc lawsoc eco sparts educ hum health tec Total Diversity
Azores 22 25 40 178 70 40 20 140 85 620 0.836
Madeira 30 50 114 55 20 60 25 73 120 547 0.887
Total 2022 2748 3273 8299 6469 1183 2300 2800 6245 11241 46580 0.910
Note: The study areas in the table are the following: agriculture (agric), architecture
(arch), natural sciences (natsc), law and social sciences (lawsoc), economics (eco), sports
and arts (sparts), education (educ), humanities (hum), health (health), and technology
(tec).
The spatial distribution of capacity, shown in Table 4, comes as no surprise; it largely
resembles the spatial distribution of the number of study programmes. Interesting enough
is the fact that the North, Centre and Lisbon, all together take 40535 places, that is, about
87% of the total places offer. It is important to note that this has a correspondence in terms
of population density, as in 2005, these regions accounted for 84% of the total population.13
According to Huisman, Kaiser and Vossensteyn (2000), diversity is among the instruments
available to governments aiming at shaping the demand for higher education. For instance,
increasing diversity enlarges the range of choices offered to students, and consequently it will
make higher education accessible to more people and will allow a better fit between supply
and demand. The potential relation between diversity and participation is further explored
in the next section. For the analysis that follows we look at programme diversity. The total
number of places by institution and field of study is used to compute a Shannon-Wiener
diversity index of each institutional study offer14
Diversitys = −
M∑
m=1
pm log pm, (1)
whereM = 10 is the number of areas of study offered by Portuguese public higher education
institutions; and pm is the proportion of study programme type m in a given institution
measured by total number of places.15
Programme diversity index values, by higher education institution, by subsystem, and for
the entire higher education system, are shown in the last column of Table 3. The overall
diversity is quite high (0.908).16 When comparing subsystems, the university subsystem
reveals a higher diversity than the polytechnic subsystem. This does not come as a surprise;
13Computations are based on information available at the Instituto Nacional de Estat´ıstica website: www.ine.pt.
14This index is used in Brose (2003), who took it from Magurran, in his work dated from 1988 on ecological diversity
measurement.
15For areas which are not present in a given university, pm log pm = 0. This follows from the L’Hoˆpital rule, according to
which limpm→0 pm log pm = 1/(1/pm) = pm = 0.
16Maximum diversity is achieved whenever places are equally distributed across all areas of study. Because 10 areas are
being considered, the maximum value for the diversity index is 1.
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it follows from the starting up conditions imposed by the Portuguese legislation.17 The
universities of Algarve and E´vora (Alentejo) are among those at the top of institutions
offering the most diverse set of studies. It might be the case that since they are located
in quite remote areas, with no competition from close-by universities, they strategically opt
for offering study programmes in all fields of study, with a small number of places, in order
to supply local students’ demand. The ISCTE18, University of Lisbon and the Technical
University, all located in Lisbon, present the lowest diversity. In fact, Lisbon counts with
four universities, which might allow for some degree of specialization, with no risk of loosing
students to other regions.
If diversity is computed using equation (1), but the proportion pm is computed based on
the number of study programmes, results on diversity do not differ very much from those
above (see Table 15, in Appendix A). The major difference is that diversity is even higher,
both in the whole system, and within each subsystem.
3.2 Demand side
Since the mid 1990s, demand for higher education has been affected by several factors,
namely: changes in demography and the reintroduction of national exams and minimum
marks as entrance conditions (MCTES, 2006; OECD, 2006). All these issues have shaped
student preferences. On top of that, peer effects are very likely to happen and individuals are
very likely to influence their colleagues and friends through their revealed preferences (Sa´,
2006). These reasons justify that the analysis of the demand in the undergraduate student
market is based on students’ revealed preferences.
Two facets of the demand for higher education are analysed. First of all, we will study
the consistency of students’ preferences. As explained in Section 2, each candidate’s choice
set has up to six choices, ranked from the most to the least preferred option. This means
that the choice sets might vary significantly across students. The choice set of some students
are only composed of university institutions, while others are only of polytechnics; a mixture
of both being also possible. The same may also occur in the study programme choice. For
example, for some students all alternative studies in their choice set belong to the same area
of study, whereas in other students’ choice set two or more fields of study are present. In
order to analyse how consistent student choice sets are, a choice set is defined as consistent
17The creation of a new university requires a minimum of 8 study programmes in at least three different areas of study,
whereas a polytechnic can be created with just two study programmes, which may belong to the same area of study (Sima˜o et
al., 2004).
18ISCTE is a specialised school, where most studies are concentrated in two fields: Law and Social Sciences, and Economics.
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when it includes only identical choices.19 Choice consistency can be analysed under four
different perspectives: (i) the type of higher education institution; (ii) the higher education
institution itself; (iii) the study programme; and (iv) the region.
Table 5: Proportion of students with consistent choice sets regarding the
higher education institution type, 2003-2006
Type of institution 2003/04 2004/05 2005/06 2006/07 Total
Non-University 0.332 0.333 0.265 0.251 0.296
University 0.477 0.486 0.486 0.458 0.476
Note: Proportions in this table are computed as the number of indi-
viduals with only that type of institution in the choice set to the total
number of individuals who have ate least one institution of that type in
the choice set.
Regarding the type of higher education institutions’ choice, it is interesting to note that
the proportion of students whose choice set only contains university options is higher than
that of students with only polytechnics in their choice set (see Table 5). It is evident that the
proportion of students with just universities in their choice sets is more stable than that of
students with a polytechnic choice set over the period under analysis. The biggest decrease
in the proportion of students with a polytechnic choice set occurred between 2004/05 and
2005/06, when it decreased about 6 percentage points.20
Table 6: Proportion of students with consistent choice sets regarding the
higher education institution, 2003-2006
Institution 2003/04 2004/05 2005/06 2006/07 Total
PI Beja 0.082 0.087 0.073 0.049 0.074
PI Braganc¸a 0.073 0.067 0.048 0.046 0.059
PI Castelo Branco 0.040 0.042 0.029 0.033 0.036
PI Ca´vado&Ave 0.156 0.116 0.083 0.048 0.094
PI Coimbra 0.064 0.055 0.039 0.045 0.051
PI Guarda 0.032 0.034 0.020 0.020 0.027
PI Leiria 0.087 0.084 0.073 0.078 0.081
PI Lisbon 0.093 0.100 0.077 0.072 0.085
PI Oporto 0.141 0.151 0.110 0.112 0.128
PI Portalegre 0.046 0.041 0.038 0.031 0.04
PI Santare´m 0.065 0.063 0.043 0.046 0.055
PI Setu´bal 0.158 0.147 0.089 0.080 0.122
PI Tomar 0.079 0.087 0.050 0.028 0.065
PI Viana do Castelo 0.066 0.077 0.040 0.045 0.058
PI Viseu 0.088 0.077 0.062 0.070 0.075
ISCTE 0.048 0.041 0.055 0.040 0.046
Technical U 0.084 0.086 0.09 0.072 0.083
U Algarve 0.178 0.172 0.159 0.144 0.162
Continued on next page...
19Consitency, however, should not be taken for the usual meaning it carries in Microeconomic theory.
20An individual has a polytechnic choice set if his choice set only contains polytechnic schools.
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... table 6 continued
Institution 2003/04 2004/05 2005/06 2006/07 Total
U Aveiro 0.068 0.071 0.068 0.059 0.066
U Azores 0.186 0.131 0.099 0.126 0.131
U Beira Interior 0.031 0.035 0.021 0.021 0.027
U Coimbra 0.067 0.064 0.057 0.057 0.061
U E´vora 0.045 0.043 0.037 0.040 0.041
U Lisbon 0.069 0.067 0.068 0.05 0.063
U Madeira 0.350 0.290 0.301 0.294 0.303
U Minho 0.085 0.084 0.090 0.086 0.086
U Nova 0.032 0.037 0.033 0.034 0.034
U Oporto 0.105 0.111 0.106 0.104 0.106
UTAD 0.046 0.051 0.035 0.043 0.044
Notes: 1. Proportions in this table are computed as the total
number of students with only that institution in the choice set
to the total number of students that have placed that institu-
tion among their choices, at least once. Most of other schools
in the polytechnic sector, namely nursing schools offer only
one study programme, which does not allow for the computa-
tion of the consistency rate.
2. U stands for University and PI stands for Polytechnic In-
stitute.
Such rates of consistency are not evenly distributed across higher education institutions.
The effect of the geographic isolation of some higher education institutions is clear in Table
6. Universities like those in Madeira, Algarve and Azores, which are geographically isolated,
show the highest consistency rates, for the overall period between 2003 and 2007 (30.3%,
16.2% and 14%, respectively). It is important to note, however, that the proportion of
students that exclusively opt for the University of Azores has decreased from 2003/04 to
2004/05. The four universities located in Lisbon show quite low consistent rates: 3.4%
for the University Nova of Lisbon, 4.6% for the ISCTE, 6.3% for the University of Lisbon,
and 8.3% for the Technical University. However, when consistency regarding the region is
analysed (see Table 7), Lisbon takes the biggest share of students that consistently choose
to study in that region (about 43%). It implies that a considerable number of students have
a strong preference for studying in Lisbon, which is obviously justified given its diversity
regarding the study programme supply. Madeira ranks second in top regions in terms of
choice consistency. In this case, it is possibly because distance constraints apply to those
living in the island, which confirms the well-known negative impact of distance on student
higher education choice (see, for instance, Sa´, Florax and Rietveld, 2004, for the case of
Dutch students).
14
Table 7: Proportion of students with consistent choice sets regarding the
region, 2003-2006
Institution 2003/04 2004/05 2005/06 2006/07 Total
Alentejo 0.092 0.091 0.076 0.074 0.084
Algarve 0.178 0.172 0.159 0.144 0.162
Centre 0.190 0.183 0.175 0.169 0.179
Lisbon 0.439 0.436 0.424 0.412 0.428
North 0.306 0.306 0.298 0.279 0.297
Azores 0.193 0.141 0.113 0.129 0.141
Madeira 0.350 0.290 0.301 0.294 0.303
Note: Proportions in this table are computed as the total num-
ber of students, whose choice set contains institutions all be-
longing to a given region, to the total of students who place at
least one institution in that region among their choices.
Table 8 shows indicators for study programme consistency, that is, how systematic the
choice sets are across areas of study. The highest consistent-choice rates are achieved in
Architecture, Health, and Technology, whereas the lowest goes for Natural Sciences Studies.
It is important to note, however, that students are constrained in their choices by the options
they made in secondary education. First of all, students attending upper secondary education
have to choose a track and an area of study. Regular education includes two main tracks, of
which the Cursos Cient´ıfico-Human´ısticos is geared for further studies.21 Students in that
track have to choose one out of five alternative areas of study: Science and Technology,
Social and Human Sciences, Social and Economic Sciences, Languages and Literatures, and
Visual Arts. All areas count with a set of courses in common, and a specific component.
By default, students from all areas can apply to all higher education study programmes.
Depending on the exams required to attend a given programme, it might imply, however,
additional work to apply to some studies.22
Table 8: Proportion of students with consistent choice sets regarding the
area of study, 2003-2006
Area of study 2003/04 2004/05 2005/06 2006/07 Total
Agriculture 0.105 0.102 0.091 0.080 0.095
Architecture 0.458 0.493 0.510 0.594 0.512
Natural Sciences 0.080 0.082 0.098 0.091 0.088
Law and Social Sciences 0.244 0.249 0.273 0.260 0.256
Economics 0.305 0.343 0.324 0.311 0.320
Sports and Arts 0.165 0.221 0.189 0.265 0.211
Education 0.184 0.175 0.159 0.135 0.166
Continued on next page...
21The other track is the Estudos Tecnolo´gicos, which prepares students for direct entry into the labour market. Although
students following this track can also apply to higher education, this is not a very common choice.
22For instance, students attending Social and Human Sciences in secondary education do not study mathematics, which
will make it harder for those students to study by themselves for the maths exam required, for instance, for most studies in
Economics.
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... table 8 continued
Area of study 2003/04 2004/05 2005/06 2006/07 Total
Humanities 0.127 0.142 0.145 0.135 0.136
Health 0.489 0.522 0.546 0.468 0.506
Technology 0.400 0.432 0.412 0.356 0.400
Note: Proportions in this table are computed as the total number of students,
whose choice set contains institutions all belonging to a given area of study, to
the total of students who place at least one institution in that region among
their choices.
The second issue to be analysed on the demand side is that of students’ preferences
regarding institutions. The demand faced by each institution can be analysed either by
means of the number of students, who have chosen it as their first choice, or counting the
number of students, who have included it in their choice set, no matter its rank. Because
the latter does not include only first-choices, but also second-best alternatives, it appears to
better measure the demand size.23
Table 9: Distribution of total hits by institution and area of study, 2006
Institution agric arch natsc lawsoc eco sparts educ hum health tec Total
Esuperiores 454 1499 8489 50 10492
PI Beja 378 85 132 638 175 55 227 611 200 2501
PI Braganc¸a 733 78 668 517 142 740 62 2394 1090 6424
PI Castelo Branco 270 631 874 625 346 103 1658 868 5375
PI Ca´vado&Ave 417 399 1007 202 2025
PI Coimbra 1151 599 127 1580 1391 109 645 223 1600 2942 10367
PI Guarda 121 143 966 711 213 448 132 1350 225 4309
PI Leiria 285 825 469 3049 946 313 293 39 1483 1122 8824
PI Lisboa 294 172 4020 2024 774 3382 2524 13190
PI Portalegre 323 198 1015 133 164 191 1052 169 3245
PI Oporto 45 161 3559 2822 327 88 5006 4017 16025
PI Santare´m 205 117 917 579 952 360 1155 244 4529
PI Setu´bal 46 71 841 1176 39 631 3 1493 1306 5606
PI Tomar 163 622 138 495 33 422 1873
PI Viana do Castelo 555 353 394 315 173 330 433 710 3263
PI Viseu 750 179 1569 675 642 60 1257 707 5839
Total Polytechnic 4980 4657 1061 21081 15090 1996 5927 934 31363 16798 103887
ISCTE 514 2432 2796 180 985 6907
Technical U 872 3420 734 2746 3025 497 1721 4826 17841
U Algarve 327 544 669 1660 1390 80 399 280 2307 726 8382
U Aveiro 192 585 2128 2220 2694 36 590 799 2199 4579 16022
U Azores 70 62 137 808 175 38 47 735 153 2225
U Beira Interior 993 813 1209 547 551 16 121 3479 336 8065
U Coimbra 163 245 1803 6216 1776 982 581 818 3730 2019 18333
U E´vora 478 655 451 1163 577 254 538 150 875 274 5415
U Lisbon 1865 2132 3136 218 240 1610 3865 1337 14403
U Madeira 52 51 997 283 40 155 51 696 113 2438
U Minho 427 706 2513 1228 786 917 1951 3616 12144
U Nova 257 141 1488 2684 2512 65 1104 2875 3225 14351
Continued on next page...
23Table 16, referring to first-option distribution, is shown in Appendix A.
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... table 9 continued
Institution agric arch natsc lawsoc eco sparts educ hum health tec Total
U Oporto 784 1468 3395 3433 986 587 672 2003 5418 4171 22917
UTAD 636 148 1751 1971 288 599 244 109 717 627 7090
Total University 3779 11119 16258 33188 18277 3909 4259 8189 30568 26987 156533
Note: 1. Hits are the total number of choice sets including a study programme in a field
of study and a given higher education institution.
2. The study areas in the table are the following: agriculture (agric), architecture (arch),
natural sciences (natsc), law and social sciences (lawsoc), economics (eco), sports and
arts (sparts), education (educ), humanities (hum), health (health), and technology (tec).
3. U stands for University and PI stands for Polytechnic Institute.
Table 9 shows the distribution of the total number of hits, by higher education institution
and field of study, in 2006.24 Total demand for university education is higher than total
demand for polytechnic education. In both subsystems, the institutions in Oporto are on
top of the demand. As expected, universities located in remote areas, such as those in the
islands of Madeira and Azores, as well as E´vora, face a lower demand.
This section portrays the Portuguese higher education system, by describing its function-
ing and providing some supply and demand measures. The next obvious question is: Does
supply meet demand? This is the main issue to be discussed in the next section, where we go
on with the analysis by assessing the supply-demand (mis)match in the Portuguese higher
education market.
4 The mechanisms at work in the higher education market
4.1 Does supply meet demand?
The analysis of supply and demand, separately, as presented in the previous section, con-
tributes for a better understanding of the two sides of the Portuguese higher education
market. However, it is important to keep in mind that higher education constitutes a special
type of market, where consumers (students) are also inputs in the production function. Fur-
thermore, public funding of higher education institutions makes it possible to charge prices
that do not reflect the actual education costs, and therefore do not guarantee the equilibrium
between demand and supply.
All these issues call for the analysis of the (mis)match between demand and supply in
the Portuguese higher education sector.25 Our aim is then to study the higher education
24When talking about hits, we are referring to the number of choice sets that include studies in a given field and in a given
higher education institution.
25Using a different set of variables, Cabral (2006) identifies and provides some measures of the imbalances in the Portuguese
higher education system. He looks at the evolution of the system in the 90s and gives some evidence of the mismatch between
the evolution of supply and demand. He stresses the deepening of the imbalances in the higher education system that resulted
from its great expansion and, he argues, its increasing inefficiency.
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market (des)equilibrium. In this section, several indicators to measure the degree of adjust-
ment between demand and supply are considered. Teixeira et al. (2004) have analysed the
presence/absence of market mechanisms in the Portuguese higher education sector. This
paper goes a step further in quantifying the higher education market (des)equilibrium, by
suggesting and computing a set of indicators, which provide the starting point for a ranking-
based analysis. Institutional rankings are central to overcome the absence of information on
quality in the Portuguese higher education system, which is a basic requirement for a real
higher education market.
The occupation rate in the higher education system, that is, the proportion of available
places that are filled, provides a first picture of the matching between supply and demand,
namely it allows for quantifying the excess supply in the system. Numbers for the whole
system show excess supply and a decreasing occupation rate. In 2003/04, 95.4% of places
were filled, but the rate has decreased to 87.5% and to 82.1% in 2004/05 and 2005/06,
respectively, and recovered to 88.0% in 2006/07.26 Occupation rate, however, hides variation
across institutions and fields of study. Looking at Table 10, some salient conclusions emerge.
First of all, the polytechnic subsystem shows a lower occupation rate than the university
subsystem, with a difference of six percentage points between them. Namely, six polytechnic
institutions show an occupation rate below 80%, while the University of E´vora is the only
university below that rate. The highest occupation rate within the polytechnic sector is the
one achieved by the Polytechnic Institute of Oporto (98.1%), immediately followed by that
of Leiria (97.2%). In the university subsystem, the occupation rate of five institutions is
above 90%, three of which have full occupation: ISCTE, and the universities of Aveiro and
Oporto have an occupation rate of about 99% or higher.
Table 10: Distribution of occupation rate by institution and area of
study, 2006
Institution agric arch natsc lawsoc eco sparts educ hum health tec Total
PI Beja 0.626 0.533 0.960 0.830 0.880 0.720 1.036 1.057 0.385 0.762
PI Braganc¸a 0.652 0.550 0.836 0.428 0.500 0.776 0.640 1.077 0.364 0.613
PI Castelo Branco 0.833 1.020 0.710 0.800 0.875 0.800 1.047 0.638 0.810
PI Ca´vado&Ave 1.049 1.000 1.007 0.694 0.936
PI Coimbra 0.956 1.086 1.033 1.034 0.883 1.033 0.874 1.050 1.139 0.783 0.928
PI Guarda 0.900 1.040 0.812 0.900 1.029 0.929 0.633 1.064 0.400 0.834
PI Leiria 0.900 1.056 1.078 1.046 1.019 1.024 0.842 0.286 1.100 0.826 0.972
PI Lisbon 1.000 1.114 1.045 0.871 1.018 1.081 0.663 0.874
PI Portalegre 0.763 0.768 0.742 0.306 0.564 0.694 1.026 0.208 0.645
PI Oporto 1.000 1.133 1.029 1.034 0.812 0.538 1.046 0.957 0.981
PI Santare´m 1.020 1.000 1.044 0.753 1.071 0.878 1.100 0.753 0.941
Continued on next page...
26These figures were computed based on data available at www.acessoensinosuperior.pt.
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... table 10 continued
Institution agric arch natsc lawsoc eco sparts educ hum health tec Total
PI Setu´bal 0.360 1.040 1.028 0.884 0.700 0.885 0.188 1.083 0.529 0.756
PI Tomar 1.029 0.797 1.029 0.614 0.257 0.256 0.561
PI Viana do Castelo 1.061 1.071 1.000 0.833 1.100 0.981 1.030 0.690 0.912
PI Viseu 0.744 1.000 0.947 0.845 0.692 0.633 1.042 0.445 0.773
Total Polytechnic 0.807 0.946 1.076 0.941 0.845 0.943 0.850 0.572 1.055 0.639 0.845
ISCTE 1.029 1.036 1.044 1.029 1.016 1.036
Technical U 0.750 1.035 0.855 0.991 1.018 0.922 1.029 0.846 0.910
U Algarve 0.867 0.758 0.793 0.946 0.940 0.633 0.719 0.790 0.973 0.713 0.850
U Aveiro 1.000 1.012 1.011 1.012 1.027 0.967 1.027 0.880 1.019 0.959 0.987
U Azores 1.045 1.000 0.950 0.944 0.943 0.550 0.450 0.933 0.553 0.838
U Beira Interior 1.059 0.938 1.061 1.064 1.040 0.190 0.314 0.984 0.292 0.822
U Coimbra 0.800 1.033 0.881 1.030 1.022 1.011 0.792 0.595 1.018 0.637 0.885
U E´vora 0.513 0.873 0.611 1.030 1.078 1.040 1.033 0.413 1.066 0.389 0.792
U Lisbon 1.015 0.745 1.024 1.000 1.011 0.463 1.020 0.918 0.848
U Madeira 0.767 0.340 1.018 1.036 0.900 0.800 1.040 1.000 0.658 0.835
U Minho 1.020 0.610 1.028 1.052 1.036 0.983 1.021 0.948 0.948
U Nova 0.600 0.709 0.839 0.819 1.019 1.000 0.756 1.000 0.898 0.881
U Oporto 0.917 1.013 0.938 1.028 1.003 1.000 1.127 0.989 1.018 0.986 0.996
UTAD 0.790 1.040 1.102 0.985 1.047 0.937 0.470 0.244 1.028 0.524 0.845
Total Universitary 0.777 0.983 0.832 1.001 1.018 0.966 0.830 0.687 1.012 0.829 0.904
Total 0.794 0.969 0.849 0.979 0.930 0.958 0.843 0.672 1.034 0.747 0.880
Notes: 1. Occupancy rates can be above 1. In some specific situations, institutions may
admit more students than the available places. For instance, when there is a group of
students with the same characteristics regarding the requirements for a given study, all of
them should be admitted, even if it implies the creation of additional places.
2. The study areas in columns are the following: agriculture (agric), architecture (arch),
natural sciences (natsc), law and social sciences (lawsoc), economics (eco), sports and arts
(sparts), education (educ), humanities (hum), health (health), and technology (tec).
3. The polytechnic subsystem includes Escolas Superiores as well, although occupation
rates for each of those schools are not shown in the table. However, occupation rates for the
whole polytechnic subsystem and for the higher education system were obtained using those
schools.
4. U stands for University and PI stands for Polytechnic Institute.
Considering the occupation rate across scientific areas, Health is clearly the field with the
highest rate (more than 100%).27 Conversely, both Humanities and Technologies present
occupation rates below 75%. Within the Technologies, only five institutions have an occupa-
tion of at least 95%: ISCTE, universities of Aveiro, Minho and Oporto; and the Polytechnic
Institute of Oporto.
Occupation rate also shows spatial variation. The North is the region where supply and
demand are closer, with an occupation rate of 90%, while in Alentejo, clearly there is an
excess in the overall supply (see Table 11).
27Note that occupation rates above 100% may follow from the rules in the national contest for allocating students. For
instance, students with the same grade point average and fulfilling all the entrance requirements should all be admitted to a
given study programme, which may imply that additional places are created in order to accommodate some students.
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Table 11: Distribution of occupation rate by NUT2 and area of study,
2006
NUT2 agric arch natsc lawsoc eco sparts educ hum health tec Total
Alentejo 0.692 0.808 0.656 0.895 0.762 1.026 0.881 0.546 1.064 0.425 0.790
Algarve 0.867 0.758 0.793 0.946 0.940 0.633 0.719 0.790 0.973 0.713 0.850
Centro 0.928 0.995 0.961 0.981 0.926 1.021 0.839 0.627 1.043 0.685 0.888
Lisboa 0.689 1.003 0.787 0.990 0.974 0.923 0.985 0.557 1.033 0.783 0.879
Norte 0.796 0.997 0.888 0.997 0.912 0.888 0.813 0.879 1.034 0.799 0.900
Ac¸ores 1.045 1.000 0.950 0.944 0.943 0.550 0.450 0.979 0.553 0.863
Madeira 0.767 0.340 1.018 1.036 0.900 0.800 1.040 1.000 0.658 0.835
Total 0.794 0.969 0.849 0.979 0.930 0.958 0.843 0.672 1.034 0.747 0.880
Note: See footnote 1, Table 10.
The analysis of the occupation rate, however, does not indicate how satisfied students
allocated to the places are. The fact that students rank over a maximum of six alternative
study/institution pairs allows us to know what their (conditional) best choices are. Table 12
shows the proportion of admitted students to the first option by higher education institution,
which is a proxy for students’ happiness. The proportion for the whole system is about
66%, which hides differences between subsystems, that is, a proportion of about 69% in
the university subsystem contrasts with a rate of about 61% in polytechnics. The highest
proportion of students admitted in their first option is achieved in the field of Technology
for both subsystems. For the other fields of study there is considerable variation across
institutions.
Table 12: First option-admitted ratio by institution and area of study,
2006
Institution agric arch natsc lawsoc eco sparts educ hum health tec Total
ENautica Infante D. Henrique 0.395 0.846 0.510
ES Enfermagem Angra Hero´ısmo 0.600 0.600
ES Enfermagem Artur Ravara 0.563 0.563
ES Enfermagem Bissaya Barreto 0.530 0.530
ES Enfermagem C. Gulbenkian Lisboa 0.645 0.645
ES Enfermagem Cidade Porto 0.264 0.264
ES Enfermagem D. Ana Guedes 0.440 0.440
ES Enfermagem Dr. Aˆngelo Fonseca 0.659 0.659
ES Enfermagem Francisco Gentil 0.183 0.183
ES Enfermagem Maria Fernanda Resende 0.686 0.686
ES Enfermagem Sa˜o Joa˜o 0.645 0.645
ES Hotelaria Turismo Estoril 0.733 0.667 0.687
PI Beja 0.472 1.000 0.500 0.628 0.909 0.111 0.561 0.351 0.857 0.583
PI Braganc¸a 0.403 0.545 0.613 0.467 0.367 0.560 0.875 0.354 0.539 0.489
PI Castelo Branco 0.486 0.686 0.648 0.635 0.486 0.550 0.516 0.573 0.587
PI Ca´vado&Ave 0.588 0.800 0.779 0.508 0.675
PI Coimbra 0.413 0.645 0.065 0.600 0.558 0.355 0.711 0.810 0.307 0.794 0.580
PI Guarda 0.407 0.385 0.458 0.604 0.333 0.554 0.684 0.359 0.714 0.492
PI Leiria 0.370 0.550 0.608 0.622 0.813 0.862 0.513 0.500 0.455 0.762 0.647
PI Lisbon 0.818 0.205 0.687 0.652 0.722 0.351 0.786 0.622
Continued on next page...
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... table 12 continued
Institution agric arch natsc lawsoc eco sparts educ hum health tec Total
PI Oporto 0.900 0.039 0.719 0.841 0.696 1.086 0.408 0.764 0.698
PI Portalegre 0.508 0.547 0.568 0.773 0.387 0.580 0.329 1.000 0.535
PI Santare´m 0.843 0.500 0.596 0.766 0.448 0.835 0.364 0.313 0.577
PI Setu´bal 0.667 0.615 0.548 0.693 0.357 0.783 1.000 0.610 0.722 0.667
PI Tomar 0.472 0.628 0.583 0.519 0.889 1.000 0.638
PI Viana do Castelo 0.486 0.587 0.700 0.782 0.576 0.583 0.559 0.552 0.585
PI Viseu 0.482 0.733 0.664 0.686 0.594 0.368 0.384 0.873 0.620
Total Polytechnic 0.472 0.634 0.343 0.627 0.697 0.505 0.631 0.718 0.446 0.732 0.608
ISCTE 0.250 0.575 0.666 0.583 0.891 0.644
Technical U 0.641 0.668 0.606 0.465 0.501 0.838 0.542 0.935 0.723
U Algarve 0.295 0.714 0.478 0.671 0.753 0.895 0.680 0.807 0.397 0.893 0.655
U Aveiro 0.489 0.605 0.447 0.586 0.584 1.207 0.675 0.592 0.540 0.767 0.630
U Azores 0.478 0.680 0.684 0.798 0.924 0.955 0.333 0.610 0.851 0.756
U Beira Interior 0.433 0.221 0.469 0.812 0.644 1.000 0.318 0.353 0.786 0.486
U Coimbra 0.563 0.742 0.486 0.759 0.769 0.677 0.284 0.675 0.536 0.821 0.679
U E´vora 0.732 0.417 0.441 0.594 0.835 0.462 0.629 0.848 0.420 0.838 0.588
U Lisbon 0.640 0.708 0.723 0.650 0.484 0.746 0.518 0.671 0.660
U Madeira 0.957 0.588 0.672 0.789 0.667 0.604 0.923 0.603 0.962 0.744
U Minho 0.627 0.651 0.738 0.895 0.774 0.606 0.677 0.645 0.691
U Nova 0.706 0.923 0.419 1.000 0.943 0.950 0.740 0.730 0.776 0.811
U Oporto 0.327 0.845 0.510 0.837 1.082 1.045 0.210 0.629 0.655 0.858 0.753
UTAD 0.442 0.500 0.345 0.616 0.910 0.618 0.638 0.545 0.622 0.736 0.581
Total University 0.510 0.656 0.517 0.706 0.768 0.771 0.575 0.676 0.563 0.815 0.687
Total 0.488 0.648 0.502 0.678 0.735 0.673 0.610 0.681 0.504 0.784 0.656
Note: 1. The first option-places ratio is computed as the total number of places taken by students who placed
it as first option to the total number of places announced.
2. The study areas in the table are the following: agriculture (agric), architecture (arch), natural sciences
(natsc), law and social sciences (lawsoc), economics (eco), sports and arts (sparts), education (educ), humanities
(hum), health (health), and technology (tec).
3. U stands for University and PI stands for Polytechnic Institute.
A deeper analysis of the market requires, however, additional measures. Firstly, an indi-
cator of the demand pressure has been computed, ri, which is the ratio of the number of hits
each institution i gets (hi) to the number of places in that institution (pi). Its computation
is based on students’ revealed preferences, and is given by:
ri =
hi
pi
. (2)
It is important to note that hits are the total number of times an institution/study is chosen.
It can be seen as an indicator of the students’ interest in the study programme, and therefore
a measure for the potential demand for that study, or its ability to attract new students.
Table 13: Indicators on market (des)equilibrium, 2006
Institution ri Oi Gi si wi
PI Beja 4.00 (13) 2.10 (9) 128 (13) 0.63 (12) 0.56 (11)
PI Braganc¸a 3.73 (14) 2.37 (15) 129 (12) 0.50 (14) 0.70 (15)
Continued on next page...
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... table 13 continued
Institution ri Oi Gi si wi
PI Castelo Branco 5.51 (6) 2.10 (9) 132 (7) 0.90 (9) 0.52 (10)
PI Ca´vado&Ave 6.21 (3) 1.70 (1) 134 (3) 1.22 (3) 0.37 (2)
PI Coimbra 6.03 (4) 2.11 (12) 132 (7) 0.93 (8) 0.46 (4)
PI Guarda 5.39 (7) 2.33 (13) 128 (13) 0.64 (11) 0.59 (12)
PI Leiria 5.39 (7) 1.92 (4) 134 (3) 1.07 (5) 0.37 (2)
PI Lisbon 6.96 (1) 1.94 (5) 142 (1) 1.45 (2) 0.46 (4)
PI Oporto 6.69 (2) 1.79 (2) 139 (2) 1.54 (1) 0.32 (1)
PI Portalegre 4.45 (11) 2.33 (13) 131 (10) 0.52 (13) 0.66 (14)
PI Santare´m 5.70 (5) 2.10 (9) 132 (7) 1.00 (6) 0.46 (4)
PI Setu´bal 4.68 (9) 1.85 (3) 133 (5) 1.10 (4) 0.50 (8)
PI Tomar 2.57 (15) 2.07 (8) 128 (13) 0.39 (15) 0.64 (13)
PI Viana do Castelo 4.62 (10) 2.03 (7) 133 (5) 0.95 (7) 0.47 (7)
PI Viseu 4.22 (12) 1.96 (6) 130 (11) 0.76 (10) 0.52 (9)
ISCTE 7.75 (2) 1.67 (4) 141 (9) 1.72 (2) 0.33 (3)
Technical U 5.70 (7) 1.69 (6) 146 (4) 1.26 (7) 0.34 (4)
U Algarve 4.78 (11) 1.93 (11) 135 (14) 1.00 (10) 0.44 (10)
U Aveiro 8.05 (1) 1.86 (9) 141 (9) 1.59 (4) 0.38 (7)
U Azores 3.95 (14) 1.61 (3) 138 (11) 0.96 (12) 0.36 (6)
U Beira Interior 6.66 (3) 2.38 (14) 142 (6) 1.16 (9) 0.60 (14)
U Coimbra 5.98 (4) 1.84 (8) 146 (4) 1.19 (8) 0.40 (9)
U E´vora 5.57 (8) 2.11 (12) 138 (11) 0.95 (13) 0.53 (13)
U Lisbon 3.96 (13) 1.88 (10) 147 (2) 0.95 (13) 0.44 (10)
U Madeira 4.46 (12) 1.60 (2) 142 (6) 1.66 (3) 0.38 (7)
U Minho 5.46 (9) 1.67 (4) 142 (6) 1.30 (6) 0.35 (5)
U Nova 5.85 (5) 1.54 (1) 147 (2) 1.44 (5) 0.29 (2)
U Oporto 5.82 (6) 1.72 (7) 154 (1) 1.77 (1) 0.25 (1)
UTAD 5.45 (10) 2.14 (13) 137 (13) 0.97 (11) 0.51 (12)
Note: 1. The occupation rate is also showed for comparison. See the text
for an explanation of the indices.
2. For each indicator we present its value, as well as the rank of the institu-
tion within each subsystem (in brackets).
3. U stands for University and PI stands for Polytechnic Institute.
The demand pressure index and the rank positions according to it are shown in the first
two columns of Table 13. Within the university sector, University of Aveiro and ISCTE are
the institutions that better perform regarding the demand pressure, contrasting with the
universities of Azores, Lisbon, Madeira and Algarve that belong to the group with the worst
performance. This may reflect the remoteness of the universities of Azores, Madeira and
Algarve. Polytechnics of Lisbon and Oporto show a high ability to attract students, whereas
those of Tomar, Braganc¸a and Beja are of interest to much less students.
Similar indicators can be computed using the set of choices of each candidate. The choice
set includes at most six choices, which are ranked according to their preferences, from the
most to the least preferred option. In order to measure the degree of preference for a given
higher education institution, we compute the average preference rank of the students who
have been actually admitted to it, Oi. The smaller Oi, the better the higher education
institution ranks.
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Going back to Table 13, University Nova of Lisbon is the most preferred institution
among admitted students, with an average preference rank of 1.54. It is closely followed by
the universities of Madeira and Azores, located in remote regions (islands). The big average
position of inland universities like those of Beira Interior, E´vora and UTAD reveal that these
are less likely to be in the top list of student choices. Regarding the polytechnic subsystem,
the picture is pretty much the same: the Polytechnics of Braganc¸a, Guarda and Portalegre
appear to be the least preferred.
From the institutions standpoint, it is obviously important to fill the places available.
It allows them to increase their capacity, and qualifies them for more public funding. But
the quality of their student body also has a non-negligible role for the position of a higher
education institution in the market. High performing students are the best inputs that an
institution may look for, as they might start a virtuous cycle of high standards in education
and stimulate research.
The stock of human capital at entrance of the pool of admitted students can work as
an indicator of student body quality, and can be proxied by the mean of their grade point
average. This indicator performance index has been called Gi. Although it proxies the
quality of the initial stock of human capital, the fact that it depends on study programme
requirements is an obvious limitation, which should be taken into account when analysing
the data. According to Table 13, University of Oporto is the institution with the best pool of
students, as shown by an average entrance grade of 150 points. Again, there are differences
between coastal and inland regions, with the former getting a better pool of students than
the latter, the fact that inland universities offer much less places. The low population density
in inland regions, associated with the fact that most higher education institutions have a
rather local catchment area, may explain, at least partly, those differences. In this regard,
it should be stressed that public higher education institutions are not entirely free to choose
their students. Places and entrance requirements are defined in advance, and institutions
have to accept all applicants that fulfil those requirements up to the limit of the numerus
clausus.
Using student revealed preferences, we can go a step further and compute strength and
weakness indicators. A major advantage of these indicators, as it will be shown later, is their
ability to suggest how the system will adjust in case of changes in market regulations. The
strength measure, si, is defined as
si =
foi
pi
, (3)
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where foi is the total number of students choosing institution i as first option. The strength
index can be interpreted as the proportion of places that are certain in the allocation of
students to higher education institutions, since the first option reveals students’ first-best.
Given their constraints, specifically their grades in secondary education and the admission
exams, students’ decisions are the result of an optimization process, and, as such, are optimal.
Under this assumption, first choices can be taken as absolute preferences that will not be
changed. Students who have chosen a given study programme/institution as their first choice
will complete their registration. If si > 1, then all places offered are filled for sure. This
means that institutions would be able to expand their capacity if they are allowed to increase
the number of places and admit more students. The opposite occurs when si < 1. That
is, an institution might not be filling all places, which can be seen as a first indicator of
institutional weakness.
From Table 13 it appears that polytechnics perform worse than universities regarding the
strength indicator. University of Oporto shows the highest value for the strength measure
(1.77). The immediate implication is that without supply constraints, the University of
Oporto could increase the number of places by 77% without excess supply. Universities of
Lisbon and E´vora, on the contrary, are the institutions with the lowest strength value in
the university subsystem. The fact that the strength index is below 1 for both implies that
the end of the numerurs clausus regulation would cause them to loose students. In the
Polytechnic subsystem, the institution in Oporto is once more the strongest one, as shown
by the value of the index (1.54), while the Polytechnic Institute of Tomar has the smallest
value of the overall system (0.49). This exercise makes it possible to get a first picture of
the effects of the end of numerurs clausus, despite some limitations that should, however, be
kept in mind. Namely, numerurs clausus are among the constraints that students take into
account when applying to higher education, and therefore it cannot be taken as guaranteed
that their choice set composition would be the same if that constraint did not apply. Values
below 1 for the strength index indicate the weakness of some higher education institutions.
There are, however, better proxies for the degree of weakness faced by a given higher
education institution. We compute a weakness index, wi, defined as
wi =
pi − FOi
pi
, (4)
where FOi is the total number of first options among the admissions to higher education
institution i. The index informs on the proportion of places filled with second-best alter-
natives, that is, the proportion of students that might be lost to other institutions in case
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the distribution of places changes. The index is bounded between 0 and 1. The lower the
value, the lower the weakness in case competing courses in other institutions were allowed
to increase numerus clausus. The weakness indicator measures the degree of students’ un-
happiness, which might have consequences on their performance, as well as on drop out
rates.
Table 13 summarizes the values for the weakness index by higher education institution.
It shows that, similarly to what happens in the strength index analysis, the University of
Oporto is the institution with the smallest proportion of students that potentially can be
lost. In the polytechnic subsystem, the Polytechnic Institute of Braganc¸a is the most fragile
institution, which in the free access (no numerus clausus) scenario would loose 70% of its
potential students (measured by places).
So far, we have discussed the indicators showing how they vary across higher education
institutions. But there are other dimensions to be analysed. In particular, there is some
variability in those indices according to the field of study. Table 14 shows the above presented
indices computed for each field of study.
Table 14: Performance indices per program area in 2006
Area ri Oi Gi si wi
Agriculture 4.04 (8) 2.29 (9) 132 (5) 0.58 (10) 0.62 (10)
Architecture 5.73 (3) 1.89 (6) 145 (2) 1.24 (3) 0.40 (3)
Natural Sciences 5.20 (5) 2.26 (8) 141 (3) 0.71 (8) 0.59 (9)
Law and Social Sciences 6.95 (2) 1.87 (5) 136 (4) 1.44 (2) 0.38 (2)
Economics 5.47 (4) 1.74 (2) 131 (7) 1.09 (4) 0.37 (1)
Sports and Arts 4.86 (6) 1.95 (7) 131 (7) 1.06 (5) 0.41 (4)
Education 4.03 (9) 1.82 (3) 129 (10) 0.84 (6) 0.50 (6)
Humanities 3.53 (10) 1.82 (3) 132 (5) 0.67 (9) 0.54 (7)
Health 10.58 (1) 2.42 (10) 156 (1) 2.15 (1) 0.55 (8)
Technology 4.12 (7) 1.60 (1) 131 (7) 0.75 (7) 0.49 (5)
Total 5.63 1.92 136.47 1.09 0.48
Notes: See notes 1 and 2, Table 13.
Several interesting conclusions come from results in Table 14. Health studies present by far
the highest number of hits per place (ri), about 10.6, revealing the highest demand pressure
in the system. Humanities, on the contrary, present the lowest tension on the demand side
(that is, 3.5). When accounting for all choices in admitted students’ choice set (Oi), we
conclude that Technology studies are in the top of the preferences: the average position is
approximately 1.6. Interesting enough is the fact that Health occupies the worst position,
with an average rank above 2.4. As a result of the difficult access to those studies, prospective
students might end up being placed in one of their low ranked preferences. Finally, the
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highest average grade among the students accepted for a given study (Gi) belongs to Health
Studies (156), and the lowest to Education Studies (less than 130). Regarding the strength
and weakness indices, Health is the area of studies counting with the highest strength (2.15),
whereas the lowest belongs to Agriculture (0.58). Economic Studies counts with the lowest
weakness level (0.37). Agriculture-type studies get in turn the highest value for the weakness
index (0.62), meaning that about 62% of the places are filled by non-first options.
4.2 Adjustment in the higher education market
The indicators presented and discussed in the previous section make it possible to measure
the degree of (dis)equilibrium between demand and supply, for the whole system and across
institutions. In this section we use those indicators to discuss the existence of a higher
education market in Portugal.
Jongbloed (2003) describes the set of necessary conditions for the existence of a higher
education market. On the supply side, higher institutions should be free to enter the market,
to specify the product, to use the available resources and to determine prices. On the
demand side, students should be free to choose the provider and the study programme,
and should benefit from adequate information on prices and quality, and should pay a price
that covers education costs. Teixeira et al. (2004) analyze the existence of each and every
condition regarding the Portuguese higher education system. These authors identify the
three main issues at stake in the higher education system that prevent the creation of a
real higher education market: (i) contestability absence; (ii) dissociation between prices
and costs; and (iii) information insufficiencies. Teixeira et al. (2004) argue that the most
important conditions for a free market are still absent from the Portuguese higher education
system. The indicators presented in the previous section seem to corroborate their view.
The existence of low entry barriers is the main feature of those markets; that is, the
threat of new entrants forces the existing institutions to behave in a competitive way. The
initial investment that new higher education institutions need to make constitutes a barrier
to freedom of entry in the market. Despite that, a good number of private institutions were
able to enter the market. Nowadays, however, the reduction in the total number of applicants
makes mergers between institutions very likely. A good example is the already announced
merger between the University of Lisbon and the Polytechnic of Lisbon, which together take
5530 places, representing a 12% market share, in public higher education, in the school year
2006/07. This is quite an interesting example involving two institutions, being each of them
quite specialized in terms of study programme offer, which will lead to a big institution with
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a more diversified study programme offer. This follows from the complementarities in terms
of study offer between the two existing institutions. If we recomputed the diversity index for
the University of Lisbon, considering the intended merger, we would find that it increased
from 0.785 to 0.863, taking into account computations based on the places available in each
field of study.
Public higher education institutions do not behave as firms in several other ways. So far,
they have been able to create the study programmes they wanted to, with public funding.
Furthermore, due to public funding, wrong decisions, so far, were never penalised with
bankruptcies, although the funding formula introduces incentives for the institutions to offer
programmes that match the demand. Otherwise, they would be indirectly penalised through
a reduction of the government financing which depends on the number of students. That
means that if the study programme offer does not match the demand, institutions are obliged
to adjust themselves as they will not receive funding for those programmes. However, there
is a high rigidity within the institutions themselves that may hinder the adjustment to the
changing conditions in the demand side of the market. Most of the rigidity comes from the
faculty staff, which takes the biggest share of higher education budgets, whose qualifications
are in most cases too specific of a scientific area. Given the difficulty institutions have to
adjust by themselves, the government recently decided to stop financing study programmes
with less than 20 students admitted. Institutions can continue to offer them, but at their
own expenses. Using data for 2006 we conclude that the fully implementation of such a
measure would result in a reduction of 234 programmes, representing 6503 places, that is,
24% and 14%, respectively. Polytechnics would be the most affected, loosing 3372 places,
that is, 18% of the places available in that subsystem.
An important conclusion from the previous section was that of an existing excess of
capacity in the system, although it is not evenly distributed across institutions and areas
of studies. Excess capacity is the consequence of demographic trends and large investments
in the public sector during the 1990s: since in 2002/03 total places exceeded the number
of candidates. This situation implies an increasing competition between higher education
institutions for students. If the market mechanisms were at work in the higher education
system, we would expect programmes facing an insufficient demand to adjust by reducing
their tuition fees, or, keeping the price constant; the adjustment would have to be made via
quantity, implying the close down of some programmes. The reverse would be expected for
programmes facing a higher demand relative to the number of places.
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In the public sector, tuition fees, the price students pay for the education they receive,
have to be within certain limits that are established by law. Institutions are free to set the
price within that interval. It is important to note, however, that even the maximum price
charged is far below the real cost of the education provided. On the other hand, in private
institutions the price is set such that students pay for the full education costs. This generates
unfair competition between institutions from the two sectors, which is on the basis of the
private institutions’ claiming for the introduction of a voucher system. Furthermore, it has
been shown that students get considerable returns from education investments (Cardoso,
2007; Portugal, 2004), suggesting that they should pay a bigger share of their education
costs. This is obviously related to students’ finance. The almost non-existent loan market
for financing education studies might be an obstacle to investment in further education and
is, at least partly, the result of information failures in the higher education market, where no
credible information on institutional and programme quality really exists. The accreditation
agency announced for 2007 can be seen as a first step towards a hierarchy of studies and
institutions that would allow for better informed decisions.
Information insufficiencies refer to both education suppliers and consumers. On the one
hand, students know very little about institutional and programme quality when applying to
higher education. In Portugal there is no tradition regarding quality assessment and ranking
of higher education institutions, which are on the basis of a real higher education market. In
fact, a real market requires that students become critical consumers, which is only possible
if information on quality is made publicly available. Although, when applying to higher
education, students do not have all the information about the quality of the programme and
about the future return of their investment; they base their decisions on their own information
set, and therefore students’ choices can be seen as optimal. In that sense, the strength and
weakness measures presented could be used as indicators of higher education institutions
quality and, therefore, as indicators of the future adjustment in the higher education system.
As an example, the strength measure could be used to evaluate the potential effect of
deregulating the Portuguese higher education market, namely, the impact of free access to
higher education (i.e., no numerus clausus), the most rigid element on the supply side. It
follows from Table 12 that ISCTE and University of Oporto could raise their places in 72%
and 77%, respectively. Institutional rankings based on students’ revealed preferences, like the
one proposed by Avery, Glickman, Hosby and Metrick (2004), may benefit from indicators
as the strength and weakness indices presented in this paper. However, further research is
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required in order to make sure that institution rankings are not a distorted picture of reality.
5 Concluding remarks
This paper contributes to the ongoing debate on the regulation and marketisation of higher
education. It aims at analysing the Portuguese higher education system by suggesting a set
of demand and supply indicators, as well as some measures of the imbalances in that market.
The supply and demand sides of the market have been analysed. University programme
diversity is higher than that in the polytechnic subsystem. Universities are more spatially
concentrated and offer the majority of places (i.e., about 60%). Total demand for the
university subsystem is higher and concentrated in the most populated regions. Applicant
preferences’ consistency is higher for the university subsystem and for institutions located
in regions with no local competition, which seems to corroborate the well-known negative
impact of distance on students’ choices.
Several measures of the (mis)match between demand and supply have been proposed.
Occupation rate shows variation across institutions, fields of study, and regions. That is, the
proportion of available places that are filled is higher in the university subsystem, although
there is a considerable variation in that rate across institutions and fields of study. Most
universities show occupation rates above 80%, whereas six polytechnics are below that level.
The highest ratio is found for Health studies with rates above 100%, contrasting with rates
below 75% for Humanities and Technology. The Northern region is where the supply and
demand are closer, with an occupation rate of 90%, while Alentejo presents excess supply.
In order to measure applicants’ well-being, we compute the proportion of students admitted
in their first option. Once again, that proportion is higher in the university (69%) than in
the polytechnic subsystem (61%). Studies in the field of Technology appear to have the best
matching (about 78%).
We also propose a set of measures to characterize the type of equilibrium in the market.
Demand pressure on study programmes and institutions, measured by the ratio of the total
number of hits to the number of places; degree of attractiveness, that is, the average pref-
erence rank; and student quality proxied by the mean grade point average of all admitted
candidates, are among the indicators in use for the analysis. University of Aveiro and ISCTE
show the highest demand pressure. Universities in regions with smaller pools of candidates,
such as those in the islands (Madeira and Azores) and the University of Algarve, as well
as the University of Lisbon, which shares the location with three other universities, face a
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lower demand. The highest average preference rank goes for the University Nova of Lisbon.
Inland universities (Beira Interior, E´vora and UTAD) are less likely to be in the top of stu-
dents’ preferences, as they are polytechnics located in inland regions (Braganc¸a, Guarda and
Portalegre). The University of Oporto receives the best pool of students with an average
entrance grade of 150 points. Coastal universities get better students, on average, than those
located in inland regions.
Finally, strength and weakness indicators, based on candidates’ revealed preferences, have
been proposed. Students’ choices are the result of an optimization process, and therefore are
optimal. Given the fact that first choices are absolute preferences, a picture of the system
stability is obtained by assessing the match between them and the corresponding available
places. We conclude that, in both subsystems, the institutions located in Oporto get the
highest value for the strength index, computed as the proportion of first options to the avail-
able places. Universities of E´vora and Lisbon are the ones performing the worst according to
that indicator. When considering the polytechnic subsystem, the lowest strength is achieved
by the Polytechnic of Tomar. The weakness index, the proportion of places filled with
second-best alternatives, complements that analysis. The index analysis confirms the best
position of the University and the Polytechnic of Oporto, whereas the Polytechnic Institute
of Braganc¸a shows up to be the most fragile institution.
These indicators can be used in predicting the impact of changes in higher education
regulations on market equilibrium and stability. Institutions with higher values for strength
and lower values for weakness indices could enhance their market share if numerus clausus
did not apply. Such policy would foster the marketisation of the higher education system, by
improving the match between demand and supply. However, a dynamic long-run analysis is
required, as such measure could also result in a reduction of the number of higher education
institutions, and therefore in a higher concentration and lower competition in the system.
The set of indicators proposed in this paper sets the stage for a rank-based analysis of
the Portuguese higher education system. Each indicator characterises the system under a
different perspective, but they also complement each other in portraying the mechanisms at
work in the market. All proposed indicators, however, refer to the application moment. A
deeper analysis on institutions performance is then needed, which requires the construction
of performance measures accounting for, for example, graduates’ labour market outcomes.
Such institutions’ rankings based on students’ revealed preferences and graduates’ labour
market outcomes, would allow for comparing institutions on a like-for-like basis, and would
30
contribute to inform student choices, a basic requirement for a real higher education market.
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Appendix A: Additional tables
Table 15: Distribution of the number of study programmes by institution
and area of study, 2006
Institution agric arch natsc lawsoc eco sparts educ hum health tec Total Diversity
ESuperiores 0 0 0 2 6 0 0 0 11 2 16
PI Beja 3 1 1 4 1 1 2 2 3 18 0.896
PI Braganc¸a 7 1 4 4 2 7 1 6 10 42 0.863
PI Castelo Branco 2 3 6 4 2 1 5 7 30 0.840
PI Ca´vado&Ave 2 1 3 2 8 0.574
PI Coimbra 5 2 1 7 4 1 3 1 6 12 42 0.874
PI Guarda 1 1 5 4 1 2 1 3 4 22 0.872
PI Leiria 2 4 2 12 5 2 3 2 2 7 41 0.900
PI Lisbon 1 1 4 3 3 11 7 30 0.722
PI Oporto 1 1 7 7 7 2 12 13 50 0.783
PI Portalegre 3 2 6 2 2 2 2 3 22 0.863
PI Santare´m 2 1 4 3 5 3 2 2 22 0.862
PI Setu´bal 1 1 3 5 1 4 1 3 8 27 0.839
PI Tomar 1 5 1 6 1 6 20 0.659
PI Viana do Castelo 4 2 2 2 1 3 1 7 22 0.817
PI Viseu 7 2 7 5 5 1 2 6 35 0.839
Total Polytechnic 38 29 6 75 64 14 46 13 68 99 452 0.902
ISCTE 1 5 5 1 3 15 0.615
Technical U 6 8 4 6 4 3 2 18 51 0.805
U Algarve 3 4 4 8 7 1 4 4 8 7 50 0.952
U Aveiro 1 2 9 5 7 1 2 5 5 14 51 0.879
U Azores 2 1 2 8 2 2 1 3 5 26 0.855
U Beira Interior 4 4 4 2 2 1 2 3 5 27 0.914
U Coimbra 1 1 7 13 3 3 2 7 3 11 51 0.871
U E´vora 3 3 6 4 2 2 2 4 2 4 32 0.969
U Lisbon 6 10 5 1 1 14 6 5 48 0.798
U Madeira 2 2 4 2 1 3 1 2 1 18 0.908
U Minho 3 6 7 3 3 6 3 13 44 0.838
U Nova 1 2 4 5 4 1 6 1 10 34 0.838
U Oporto 3 5 10 7 2 1 1 10 5 13 57 0.889
UTAD 6 1 6 6 2 2 3 2 1 6 35 0.918
Total University 26 43 74 87 45 18 24 63 44 115 539 0.938
Total 64 72 80 162 109 32 70 76 112 214 991 0.948
Notes: 1. The study areas in the table are the following: agriculture (agric), architecture (arch),
natural sciences (natsc), law and social sciences (lawsoc), economics (eco), sports and arts (sparts),
education (educ), humanities (hum), health (health), and technology (tec).
2. U stands for University and PI stands for Polytechnic Institute.
Table 16: Distribution of first options by institution and area of study,
2006
Institution agric arch natsc lawsoc eco sparts educ hum health tec Total
Esuperiores 190 458 2064 11 2723
PI Beja 34 16 12 110 40 2 37 113 30 394
PI Braganc¸a 64 12 130 50 12 100 14 333 142 857
PI Castelo Branco 34 106 157 72 42 11 345 109 876
PI Ca´vado&Ave 71 80 206 40 397
PI Coimbra 126 136 3 301 155 14 144 65 217 438 1599
PI Guarda 11 15 89 99 29 44 13 180 30 510
Continued on next page...
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... table 16 continued
Institution agric arch natsc lawsoc eco sparts educ hum health tec Total
PI Leiria 26 163 97 592 237 89 52 5 277 218 1756
PI Lisbon 190 18 803 471 260 565 446 2753
PI Oporto 39 6 794 776 140 52 1078 790 3675
PI Portalegre 44 32 127 17 12 29 98 20 379
PI Santare´m 46 14 154 103 137 82 233 21 790
PI Setu´bal 6 17 135 233 5 197 3 459 260 1315
PI Tomar 17 93 25 80 8 62 285
PI Viana do Castelo 91 64 107 85 22 75 127 96 667
PI Viseu 90 47 323 119 87 7 278 103 1054
Total Polytechnic 589 1015 136 4117 3201 310 1272 207 6367 2816 20030
ISCTE 81 569 665 22 192 1529
Technical U 151 751 81 365 448 325 504 1322 3947
U Algarve 25 113 82 331 262 17 104 74 573 177 1758
U Aveiro 26 146 299 439 397 35 131 181 485 1018 3157
U Azores 11 22 36 227 65 21 3 119 40 544
U Beira Interior 136 77 184 107 107 4 7 729 55 1406
U Coimbra 18 69 243 1382 338 184 70 116 832 391 3643
U E´vora 168 104 50 211 106 38 86 30 97 31 921
U Lisbon 491 563 879 45 44 260 948 217 3447
U Madeira 26 10 391 121 12 37 38 199 76 910
U Minho 129 146 671 330 218 183 479 737 2893
U Nova 36 36 160 767 788 21 177 957 580 3522
U Oporto 155 754 635 1117 452 421 71 409 1785 1182 6981
UTAD 132 27 183 386 81 157 30 6 175 88 1265
Total University 722 2885 2565 7919 4160 1362 816 1506 7882 6106 35923
Note: 1. The total number of first-options in this table refers to the number of student
choice sets which fisrt choice is a study on a given area of study in a given university.
2. The study areas in the table are the following: agriculture (agric), architecture
(arch), natural sciences (natsc), law and social sciences (lawsoc), economics (eco),
sports and arts (sparts), education (educ), humanities (hum), health (health), and
technology (tec).
3. U stands for University and PI stands for Polytechnic Institute.
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